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A

n estimated 6.7 million
individuals in the United States are
between the ages of 16 and 24 and are
not employed, not in school, and have
not earned a postsecondary credential.
An acronym that is applied to these
individuals is NEET (not employed or in
education and training). A more hopeful
appellation is opportunity youth (OY).
This article is based on a recent policy
paper (Hollenbeck [2014]; see http://
research.upjohn.org/up_policypapers/18)
that reviews policies targeted at OY and
examines the extent to which sectoral
initiatives, which operate on the demand
side of the labor market, can help to
facilitate pathways into productive
careers.1
Sectoral Initiatives
Workforce development sectoral
initiatives have evolved from the work
of Michael Porter (1990, 1998, 2000) on
the economic development advantages of
industrial clusters. Such clusters involve
collections of regionally based companies
operating horizontally or vertically in
the same industrial sector(s) in order
to exploit localized agglomeration
economies. These economies, or positive
externalities, are at least threefold:
1) Benefits that arise from an
accessible labor pool with
appropriate skills; not only do
incumbent workers possess the
needed skills heightened by on-the-

job training and experience, but
training institutions in the region that
are meeting the local demands are
likely to offer to potential workers
the skills training that is suitable to
the cluster.
2) Development of supplier firms
(second- and third-tier firms)
that keep inputs available and
presumably competitively priced.
3) Network effects: proximity facilitates
communication flows that may
lead to innovation, business-tobusiness transactions, and increasing
interdependence.
Workforce development entities,
recognizing the need for involvement
of private sector and other employers
in order to be successful, have formed
partnerships with firms in clusters. We
refer to these partnerships as sectoral
initiatives. A major advantage of these
initiatives is that the workforce systems
develop networks with employers that
allow them to more effectively train and
place customers (see Conway and Giloth
[2014]). From a workplace development
perspective, sectoral initiatives narrow or
bound the occupations that trainees can
focus on, and they are a convenient venue
from which to derive employer input into
training delivery and job development.
An important structural element
of workforce development sectoral
initiatives is the intermediary that
organizes and convenes (in person or
virtually) the participants. In general,
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employers focus on their own production
issues (inputs, throughputs, and outputs)
and maintain their customer base.
Furthermore, employers are engaged
in competition with other employers.
Educators and workforce development
agencies typically focus on providing
services to customers needing skill
training and job search assistance. Often,
the educational and workforce agencies
consider themselves to be in competition
as well. An intermediary organization
(which sometimes may come from the
education or workforce development side
of the market) brings together employers,

Sectoral initiatives are
a convenient venue from
which to derive employer
input into training delivery
and job development.
educators, and workforce development
agencies to identify and exploit areas
in which collaboration among the
entities is possible and beneficial.
In some instances, the collaboration
may bring in economic development
agencies, philanthropic organizations,
governmental agencies, or others with an
interest in the economic or community
development goals of the initiative.
On the supply side of the labor
market, the intermediaries get involved
in recruitment; provision of services,
such as training; provision of or referral
to support services, as necessary;
placement; and follow-up assistance. On
the demand side of the labor market, the
intermediaries conduct job development,
organize and communicate with the
sectoral network of firms, and help them
meet their labor market needs.
Evidence about the Impact of Sectoral
Initiatives on OY
Maguire et al. (2010) is usually
considered the most rigorous evaluation
of sectoral initiatives. This study features
a random assignment framework for
evaluating the net impact of sectoral
initiatives on the employment and
earnings of individuals at three fairly
large, established workforce development
programs: Wisconsin Regional Training
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Program (WRTP) in Milwaukee, Jewish
Vocational Services (JVS-Boston),
and Per Scholas in Brooklyn. These
programs serve individuals of all ages
with several different employment
barriers, but in particular, around 30
percent of the clients are aged 18–24.
The WRTP program provides short-term
preemployment training in construction,
manufacturing, and health care; JVSBoston provides training in preparation
for jobs in medical billing and
accounting; and Per Scholas focuses on
computer technician occupations.
Maguire et al. (2010) find quite
positive outcomes for the overall
population of participants—annual
earnings increases of $4,500 (about 18
percent), more months of employment,
higher wage rates, and a greater
likelihood of holding jobs with benefits.
Most of the positive outcomes occurred
in the second follow-up year. For youth
aged 18–24 in 2003, when data from all
the sites were pooled, the statistically
significant net impacts were about $3,100
in annual earnings in the second year,
one month of extra employment in the
second year, 237 hours of employment in
the second year, 2.7 extra months in the
first year with a wage rate over $11 per
hour, and 2.0 extra months in the second
year with a wage rate over $11 per hour.2
Whereas the report does not break out
the quantitative results by site for the
youth subgroup, the text notes that youth
at the JVS-Boston site did particularly
well vis-à-vis the control group. Maguire
et al. (2010) suggest that this may have
occurred because of particularly effective
supports at that site.3
Gasper and Henderson (2014) assess
the employment and earnings outcomes
of individuals who participated at one of
three Career Centers in New York City.
They also find statistically significant
impacts for youth aged 18–24. The three
sectoral initiatives are the Transportation
Career Center, the Healthcare Career
Center, and the Manufacturing Career
Center. The study uses a quasiexperimental approach that statistically
matches individuals who received
services from the sector-focused career
centers to individuals who received
services at the Workforce 1 Career
Centers in New York City (the city’s one-

stops). The percentage of participants
in the 18–24-year-old age range in this
study is only about 12 percent compared
to 30 percent in Maguire et al. (2010).
Nevertheless, Gasper and Henderson
(2014) find statistically significant
employment and earnings impacts
for youth aged 18–24 in the first year
after program exit.4 The net impact of
the sector-focused career centers on
employment in the fourth quarter after
exit was 3.8 percentage points, or about 6
percent. This was statistically significant.
Also statistically significant was the net
impact on total earnings for the four
quarters after exit—$3,294, a percentage
increase of about 30 percent. In short, this
evaluation presents quite strong evidence
that a sectoral initiative can have positive
employment and earnings impacts on
young people aged 18–24.
Policy Recommendations
Whereas the focus of the review
paper is on the demand side of the
labor market—that is, how workforce
development sectoral initiatives can help
to engage OY in employment or training
activities—it should be noted that a root
cause of the disengagement of many
youth is a poor experience or preparation
in high school. Strengthening career and
technical education, and in particular,
integrating work-based learning

A root cause of the
disengagement of many
youth is a poor experience or
preparation in high school.
opportunities, may make high school
more relevant and interesting for at-risk
students and may stem disengagement.
The intermediaries and workforce
development partners in sectoral
initiatives should ensure that partnerships
include K–12 districts, particularly
the career and technical education
administrators of those districts, and
firms should make an effort to serve on
career and technical education advisory
committees and offer internships or other
work-based learning opportunities.
In considering the liabilities and
needs of OY, overcoming technical or
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employability skill deficiencies and
simultaneously providing means of
support imply solutions that pair “learning
and earning.” Apprenticeships are an
obvious model, wherein individuals
are employed and receiving on-the-job
training, while also pursuing related
academic instruction. Traditionally,
apprentices are older than 24, but
programs such as the Wisconsin Youth

Most research on youth
programs note that it is a
hard demographic in which
to make a lot of progress and
bring programs to scale.
Apprenticeship model serve high school
students.5 Again, this kind of program
can engage youth who might otherwise
flounder in high school and drop out.
Because members of the OY
population are not engaged in training
or education, outreach to these young
people may present a challenge. As a
consequence, it would seem incumbent
upon workforce intermediaries or other
workforce development agencies to
have the capability to immediately
assist any young person who happens
to encounter the agency. Technology
should be available to allow an individual
to complete a skills and competency
inventory and output a resume on a flash
drive. Private sector employers who are
on workforce boards or are otherwise
involved in sectoral initiatives should
participate in career fairs for youth,
at which they can engage in mock
interviews and critique the job search and
interview skills of participants.
Many OY have entrepreneurial skills
that can and should be triggered. Wellpublicized competitions or mentorships
with successful entrepreneurs are
strategies that may capture and display
entrepreneurial abilities. The policy
paper cites an example in Paris, where
an annual competition called Talent
Revealers is staged in which the most
successful young entrepreneur is
recognized and given a cash prize of
12,000 euros, which is contributed by
companies.
As a closing note, it should be
recognized that there is no “silver bullet”
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that solves all the issues for OY. Marginal
progress may be the best that can be
accomplished. Whereas some studies find
positive outcomes for some programs,
most research on youth programs note
that it is a hard demographic in which
to make a lot of progress and bring
programs to scale. One lesson that has
emerged from the existing literature is
that adequate planning is a necessity. A
good example to study is the New York
City Young Adult Sectoral Employment
Project (see JobsFirstNYC [2014]).
The lesson from this initiative is that
it is best to go slowly and get potential
intermediaries and employers together
to jointly formulate interventions before
actually enrolling youth.
Notes
1. Funding for the paper was provided
by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Pew
Charitable Trusts. I would like to thank
Jennifer Thornton of the Pew Charitable
Trusts for her thoughtful guidance in
developing the paper. The views expressed in
that paper and in this article are solely mine
and do not necessarily reflect those of the
supporting institutions.
2. The control group worked, on average,
7.4 months of the second year and averaged
1,095 hours for the year. The treatment group
worked, on average, 8.4 months of the second
years and averaged 1,332 hours of work for
the year.
3. Maguire et al. (2010) note that there
were no statistically significant impacts at the
WRTP or Per Scholas sites for youth, which
means that positive results were not sizable
enough relative to their standard errors to be
statistically significant.
4. At first blush, it appears as though the
timing of the positive outcomes for the two
evaluations differs. However, the difference
is likely due to the baseline starting point.
The Maguire et al. (2010) random assignment
evaluation measures outcomes relative to the
start date, whereas the Gasper and Henderson
(2014) evaluation measures outcomes relative
to the program’s exit date.
5. Sum et al. (2014) indicate that Georgia
and South Carolina also have developed youth
apprenticeship programs.
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Seth Gershenson

Did No Child Left Behind
Affect Teacher Attendance?
Evidence from North Carolina

A

ttaching incentives to students’
performance on standardized exams has
the potential to alleviate the principalagent problem inherent in the relationship
between stakeholders and schools,
improve student achievement, and
reduce the costs of public education.
Indeed, this is the motivation behind the
state-level consequential accountability
policies introduced in the 1990s and the
2001 passage of the federal No Child
Left Behind Act (NCLB).1 The efficacy
of such policies is central to the current
debate surrounding the reauthorization of
the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, under which NCLB was first passed.
Consequential accountability policies
are typically associated with modest,
statistically significant increases in
student achievement ranging from 10
to 30 percent of a test-score standard
deviation (Figlio and Loeb 2011).
However, critics contend that these
test-score gains are illusory and reflect
strategic responses by schools rather
than true learning gains. Evidence of
strategic responses to the incentives
provided by consequential accountability
policies runs the gamut from the
relatively innocuous (e.g., “narrowing of
the curriculum”) to the nefarious (e.g.,
explicit teacher cheating). As a result, the
mechanisms through which consequential
accountability policies affect academic
achievement are not entirely understood,
but they have implications for the design
of future education policies and the
public sector performance standards
movement more generally.
Increased teacher effort is one
potential mechanism through which
consequential accountability policies
might improve student achievement,
as teachers play a critical role in the
educational process. Teacher attendance
measures one dimension of teacher
effort that is known to affect student

4

achievement.2 Moreover, teacher
absences are financially costly and create
negative externalities by influencing
the attendance of their peers. This
article is based on a recent Upjohn
Institute Working Paper (Gershenson
[2015]; see http://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/217/) that examines
one potential mechanism through
which consequential accountability
policies affect student achievement by
considering how, if at all, the threat of
sanctions associated with failing to meet
NCLB’s performance standards affected
teacher absence rates in North Carolina.
Accountability Pressure in Early Years
of NCLB
NCLB required all schools to make
adequate yearly progress (AYP), which
included meeting percent proficient,
attendance, and test-participation
thresholds both overall and for specific
subgroups of the student population.
Furthermore, the act mandated additional
sanctions (e.g., restructuring and state
takeover) on Title 1 schools that failed
to make AYP in consecutive years. The
subsequent discussion focuses on Title 1
schools, as they comprise the majority of
North Carolina’s public primary schools,
and the threat of sanctions there was
particularly salient.
In 2004, teachers in schools that
failed to make AYP in 2003 (the first
year of NCLB) were under considerably

more pressure than their counterparts in
schools that made AYP in 2003, as the
former were in schools at risk of failing
to make AYP for two consecutive school
years.3 Thus, teachers in schools that
failed to make AYP in 2003 compose the
treatment group, while their counterparts
in schools that made AYP in 2003
compose the control group. However,
a simple comparison between the 2004
attendance records of teachers in the
treatment and control groups is unlikely
to provide a valid estimate of the effect
of failing to make AYP on teacher
absences, as the treatment (i.e., failing
to make AYP in 2003) was not randomly
assigned to schools. Specifically, the
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003
might systematically differ from their
counterparts that made AYP in 2003 in
both observable and unobservable ways.
Main Results
That problem can be avoided using a
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy
that uses data from 2003 to control for
preexisting differences between treatment
and control schools. The method’s name
comes from the fact that in its simplest
form, the DD estimate is simply the
difference between two differences: the
difference in average annual absences
between treatment and control schools,
between 2003 and 2004. Table 1 presents
the sample averages used to compute the
DD estimate of the effect of failing to
make AYP on annual teacher absences.
The DD point estimate of −1.25, which
is strongly statistically significant,
suggests that on average teachers in
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003
took 1.25 fewer absences in 2004. To
put this number in perspective, note that
the average teacher was absent about
8.7 times per year, so 1.25 represents a

Table 1 Mean Annual Teacher Absences
Year
School failed in 2003 School passed in 2003
2004
7.97
8.97
2003
9.01
8.76
Difference
−1.04
0.21

Difference
−1.00
0.25
−1.25***

NOTE: N = 8,080 teacher-years. The standard error of the difference-in-differences estimate of
−1.25, which is robust to clustering at the school level, is 0.43. ***p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data
Center.

Employment Research

Sensitivity Analysis
The DD estimates discussed above
are suggestive of a causal effect of
failing AYP in 2003, and the resulting
increase in accountability pressure, on
teachers’ 2004 attendance. However, the
validity of DD estimates hinges on the
“common trends” assumption that there
was no preexisting differential trend
in teacher absences in treated schools
(i.e., schools that failed AYP in 2003).
This assumption is easily tested in an
event-study framework using several
years of data prior to the passage of
NCLB. Intuitively, the event-study model
includes placebo “treatment effects”
of failing AYP in 2003 on absences in
prior years. Event-study estimates, using
data from 1997 to 2004, are depicted in
Figure 1. The bars represent the effect of
failing AYP in 2003 on annual teacher

Figure 1 Event-Study Estimates, 1997–2004
1.5
1
0.5
0
Absences

14 percent decrease. The DD estimate
remains similar in magnitude when the
sample is restricted to teachers who did
not change schools between 2003 and
2004, which suggests that the effect of
sanctions associated with failing AYP
on teacher absences is driven by withinteacher changes in behavior, not by
changes in the composition of schools’
teaching staffs. The decrease is even
larger among more effective teachers
who attended selective undergraduate
institutions and who have higher valueadded measures of effectiveness.
More sophisticated regression-based
DD estimators that control for observed
teacher qualifications, observed school
characteristics, school fixed effects,
teacher fixed effects, and school-specific
time trends yield similarly sized,
statistically significant estimates ranging
from about −1.0 to −1.6. These results
suggest that the main results are not
driven by changes in the student bodies
of “treatment” schools relative to those
of “control” schools between 2003 and
2004. The DD estimate presented in
Table 1 is similarly robust to the way in
which teacher absences are measured.
For example, the analogous DD estimate
of the effect of accountability pressure on
the likelihood that a teacher is absent 15
or more times per school year is −0.03,
which represents a 30 percent decline.
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í0.5
í1
í1.5
í2
í2.5

T*Failed

95% Confidence interval

NOTE: 95% confidence intervals, which are robust to clustering at the school level, are reported.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data
Center.

absences in each year from 1998 onward.
If the common trends assumption
holds—that is, there is no preexisting
differential trend in the treated schools—
the 1998–2003 interaction terms should
be statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Indeed, this is exactly what we see
in Figure 1, as each of the 95 percent
confidence intervals includes zero.
However, in 2004, the year in which we
expect to see an effect of failing AYP in
2003, the estimated effect is about −1.10
and statistically significantly different
from zero. This is in line with the DD
estimates discussed above and provides
further evidence that the DD estimate
presented in Table 1 can be given a causal
interpretation.
Conclusion
The estimated effect of performance
standards on teacher absences is
consistent with previous research on
the malleability of teacher effort, as
Ahn (2013) and Jacob (2013) find
evidence that teacher effort, as measured
by teacher absences, responds to
incentives. Moreover, the magnitudes of
the effects discussed above are similar
to those of the estimated effects of a
policy change in Chicago that granted
principals the discretion to dismiss

probationary teachers (Jacob 2013).
Finally, the estimates reported here likely
underestimate the total effect of NCLB’s
accountability pressure on teacher effort,
as NCLB placed pressure on all schools,
including those that made AYP in 2003,
and attendance only represents one
dimension of effort.
The results discussed here have at
least three implications for education
policy and for public-sector performance
standards more generally. First, that
teacher absences declined in response
to increased accountability pressure
suggests that one mechanism through
which consequential accountability
policies affect student achievement is
through increased teacher effort. Second,
these results contribute to the growing
body of evidence that teacher effort, as
measured by absences, responds to both
school- and individual-level incentives.
In particular, salient incentives associated
with school-level academic performance
can alter individual teacher behaviors.
Finally, the heterogeneity in teachers’
responses to the threat of sanctions
suggests potential benefits to policy
designs and teacher training programs
that account for such differences. For
example, to the extent that teachers in
tested and nontested grades responded
differently to the threat of sanctions,
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standard labor economic theory suggests
that if jobs in tested grades are more
stressful, such jobs can pay compensating
differentials. The differentials need not be
monetary and could instead be provided
in the form of additional planning
periods, teaching aids, mentorship, or
professional development. Similarly, that
the increase in effort was particularly
strong among more effective teachers
suggests that providing additional support
to less effective teachers may be helpful,
particularly for teachers and schools
subject to increased accountability
pressure.
Notes
1. See Figlio and Loeb (2011) for a
thorough review of such policies.
2. For example, Herrmann and Rockoff
(2012) provide persuasive evidence that
teacher absences in New York City’s public
schools harmed student achievement.
3. Years refer to the spring semester of
academic years, so 2003 refers to the 2002–
2003 academic year.
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2015 Early Career Research Award Winners
The Upjohn Institute announces the winners of the 2015 Early Career Research
Awards. These grants are intended to provide resources for junior faculty
(untenured and within six years of having earned a PhD) to carry out policyrelated research on labor market issues.
• Shantanu Bagchi, Towson University
“Differential Mortality and the Progressivity of Social Security”
• Samuel Bazzi, Boston University
“Firm Entry Barriers, Growth Constraints, and Job Creation: Theory and
Evidence from Brazil”
• Erin Todd Bronchetti, Swarthmore College and Melissa McInerney,
Tufts University
“Does Increased Access to Health Insurance Impact Claims for Workers’
Compensation? Evidence from Massachusetts Health Care Reform”
• Rafael Dix-Carneiro, Duke University
“Trade and Informality in the Presence of Labor Market Frictions”
• Shushanik Hakobyan, Fordham University
“Trade Shocks and Gender Wage Gap”
• Kyle Handley, University of Michigan
“Offshoring and Employment: Evidence from Firm Microdata”

Ahn, Tom. 2013. “The Missing Link:
Estimating the Impact of Incentives on
Teacher Effort and Instructional Effectiveness
Using Teacher Accountability Legislation
Data.” Journal of Human Capital 7(3):
230–273.

• Grant Jacobsen, University of Oregon
“The Labor Market Effects of U.S. Shale Gas and Oil Development”

Figlio, David, and Susanna Loeb. 2011.
“School Accountability.” In Handbook of
the Economics of Education, Vol. 4. Eric
A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, and Ludger
Woessmann, eds. Amsterdam: North Holland,
pp. 383–421

• Timothy Moore, George Washington University and National Bureau of
Economic Research
“The Effects of Disability Employment Protections on Social Security
Disability Insurance”

Gershenson, Seth. 2015. “Performance
Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence
from Teacher Absences.” Upjohn Institute
Working Paper No. 15-217. Kalamazoo,
MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
Herrmann, Mariesa A., and Jonah E.
Rockoff. 2012. “Worker Absence and
Productivity: Evidence from Teaching.”
Journal of Labor Economics 30(4): 749–782.
Jacob, Brian A. 2013. “The Effect of
Employment Protection on Teacher Effort.”
Journal of Labor Economics 31(4): 727–761.
Seth Gershenson is an assistant professor in the
School of Public Affairs at American University.
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• Daniel MacDonald, California State University San Bernardino
“The Effects of Increasing the Minimum Wage on Prices: Analyzing the
Incidence of Policy Design and Context”

• Nicholas Papageorge, Johns Hopkins University
“Non-Cognitive Skills and Self Employment”
• Brian Phelan, DePaul University
“Wage Shocks and Technological Substitution”
• Martin Schmalz, University of Michigan
“The Human Costs of Bank Speculation”
• Nicholas Sly, University of Oregon
“Labor Market Effects of Offshoring within and across Firm Boundaries”
• Russell Weinstein, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
“Dynamic Responses to Labor Demand Shocks: Evidence from the Financial
Industry in Delaware”
• Nicolas Ziebarth, Cornell University
“Assessing the Value of Mandated Sick Pay Schemes for the U.S.”
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Student loans are instrumental in broadening access
Among the most pressing policy questions in the United
to
postsecondary educational opportunities. For many
States and other advanced economies are those concerning
individuals
who want to develop their own human capital
the impact of globalization: Has globalization fostered
but
who
otherwise
do not have the means, loans serve as
productivity growth and well-being in
an
important
supplement
to governmental or institutional
advanced economies? Or have the
grants
in making educational
forces of globalization weakened
investments
affordable and increasing
key national industries, resulted in
the
educational
attainment of the
widespread worker dislocation and
population.
The
availability of
wage stagnation, and worsened
student
loans
thus
has great value for
inequality? Understanding the
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students
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a
whole.
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However, the burgeoning volume
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that
many people now experience
and national statistical systems
have
created a vigorous debate on
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h
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transactions.
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costs?
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with
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question
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they pose, and propose solutions to address significant biases
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and
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as
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